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THE JOURNAL OF
APPELLATE PRACTICE
AND PROCESS
BOOK REVIEW
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE CULTURAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL ROLES OF APPELLATE COURTS*
Paul D. Carrington**
The new edition of Appellate Courts: Structures,
Functions, Processes and Personnel was produced to serve law
students in a course on Appeals. It is well done. The course
should be in the curriculum of every law school that hopes not
only to supply law clerks, staff attorneys for appellate courts, or
(most especially) appellate judges, but also leaders of the
organized bar and top government lawyers who share
responsibility for the laws governing appellate courts and their
proceedings. Better knowledge of its subject might even help a
lawyer win a case every now and then.
*See Appellate Courts: Structures,Functions, Processes,and Personnel (Daniel J. Meador,
Thomas E, Baker, & Joan E. Steinman eds., 2d ed., Lexis-Nexis 2006) [hereinafter the
Second Edition].
** Professor of Law, Duke University. As noted in the text of this review, I was a nominal
co-editor of the first edition of this book. Professor Meador and I have been friends for
forty years, sometimes co-authors, and sometimes allies in endeavors at judicial law
reform. I am also sometimes amiably quoted in the book. I have, however, had no role
whatever in the development of this edition. In the spring of 2006, 1 for the first time taught
a course on Appeals as the second to Professor Michael Tigar, who is, among other
distinctions, the co-author of the definitive text on the subject. Michael E. Tigar & Jane B.
Tigar, FederalAppeals: Jurisdictionand Practice (3d ed., West Group 1999). Jena Levin
provided valuable assistance to preparing this review.
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Many of the issues presented in this book are seldom
noticed by many law teachers or their students.' Some of these
are narrowly technical in nature. For example, who teaches that
the time for appeal is "jurisdictional" in the sense that no court
may, even for good cause, grant an extension? Many have
protested this excessive rigidity; 2 yet the Supreme Court applied
it again in 2007 to bar an appeal from a habeas denial that was
filed two days late but before the date specified by the district
judge. 3 The judge simply misread the calendar by three days,
and no one representing the state objected, perhaps because its
lawyers shared the appellant's counsel's failure to notice the
error. Even a well-educated and reasonably careful lawyer could
have forfeited his clients' rights in such circumstances. And it is
hard to see what harm was done to the state by giving the
prisoner a couple of extra days to appeal.
The brutal result in Bowles v. Russell was based on the
conclusory declaration that the time for appeal has long been
held to be "jurisdictional," and therefore cannot be extended for
any reason. 4 Five Justices disowned their power to "create
equitable exceptions," 5 i.e., to do justice even when the mistake
was made by a federal district judge and counsel for the state
made no objection to the extra days. As the dissenters observed,
the appellant's appointed counsel
probably just trusted that the date given was correct, and
there was nothing unreasonable in so trusting. The other
1. An exception was the Duke Law students who in 1983 joined in writing a thorough,
careful restatement of the law of federal appellate jurisdiction as a contribution to a double
issue of Law and Contemporary Problems. They sought to clarify an arcane subject and
won the approval of a conference of eminent federal appellate judges, some of whom
contributed essays to the issue. See Student Authors, Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction:
An Interlocutory Restatement, 47-2 L. & Contemp. Probs. 13 (1984). I take this occasion to
salute their memorable efforts. Alas, the complexity of the problems they addressed
assured that no simple solutions could be provided.
2. The Second Edition's editors at page 161 cite four critics of the absolute rule
invoked by the Court: this reviewer, and Professors Edward Cooper, Maurice Rosenberg,
and Mark Hall. I know of no published defense of it.
3. Bowles v. Russell,__ U.S. _, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (2007).
4. Id. at 2362, 2366 (noting that the Court has "long and repeatedly held that the time
limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in nature," and announcing that
"[t]oday we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a
jurisdictional requirement"). This doctrine is considered critically on pages 158-161 of the
Second Edition.
5. Bowles, 127 S.Ct. at 2366.
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side let the order pass without objection, either not caring
enough to make a fuss or not even noticing the discrepancy;
the mistake of a few days was probably not enough to ring
the alarm bell to send either lawyer to his copy of the
federal 6rules and then off to the courthouse to check the
docket.
One cannot say with certainty that if they had taken a law school
course designed around this book, the majority of the Court
would have reached a more sensible result, but surely it is an
aim of professional education to demean such disgraceful
nonsense as that expressed in the majority opinion.
The course and the book are, however, about much more
than such legal technicalities. The book is a critical assessment
of the cultural and institutional roles of appellate courts. Few
lawyers, even those appointed or elected to an appellate bench,
or who serve in high government offices, have ever thought
critically about many of the issues posed. The chief thing
American lawyers learn in law school about appellate courts is
that they make law. And perhaps the primary motive of those
lawyers seeking appellate judgeships is an ambition to exercise
that lawmaking power. But this volume goes beyond the basics
to raise the fundamental questions that even moot court practice
seldom raises: Who are these persons I address when making an
argument as counsel? What is their role in the legal system?
What claims have a litigant or his counsel to their attention?
What claim has the trial judge under review to a measure of
deference? The editors aptly quote Judge Dickson Phillips's
observation that the answers to these questions are "surprisingly
unsystematic and relatively obscure."
Given this obscurity and the fixation of law schools on the
lawmaking function of appellate courts, it is unsurprising that
appellate judges tend to delegate to law clerks and staff
attorneys the onerous and less celebrated or less rewarding work
that comes with the bulk of the appeals, and to save for
themselves opportunities to express views on the public policies
6. Id. at 2372 (footnote omitted) (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
7. Second Edition at 222 (quoting J. Dickson Phillips, Jr., The Appellate Review
Function: Scope of Review, 47-2 L. & Contemp. Prob. 1 (1984)). And see Chad M.
Oldfather, Appellate Courts, HistoricalFacts,and the Civil-CriminalDistinction, 57 Vand.
L. Rev. 437 (2004).
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of the day in ever longer but fewer published opinions. In the
federal system, most lawyers are not heard to speak at oral
argument, so the judges responsible for deciding their cases need
neither be seen nor demonstrate their familiarity with the issues
presented. Indeed, many, many appeals are decided by
memoranda written by staff attorneys subject to nominal
oversight by those appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate to assure the correctness of the actions of United
States courts.
The tendency of judges to delegate is magnified in the
federal courts by the reality that the appetite for lawmaking
pervades the federal judiciary. Even the trial judges subject to
the appellate courts' review have also acquired large staffs to
which they delegate the tasks that seem humdrum and unworthy
of their full attention. That tendency is so visible that Judge
Patrick Higginbotham has questioned why we still call them
"trial judges" if they no longer conduct trials.8 District Judge
Brock Homby explains that having less to do in the courtroom,
he is using his law clerks to write long legal opinions 9 because
the appellate courts are increasingly applying their work model
to the trial judges. 10 And at the other end of the hierarchy the
Supreme Court has done much the same, delegating its less
exciting duties to staff and to lower courts so that the Justices
can enjoy writing fewer but longer opinions. Among the judicial
duties often delegated by the Supreme Court to lower courts is
responsibility for the legal correctness of the dispositions in
cases it considers when performing its more exhilarating

8. Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts? 55 S.M.U. L.
Rev. 1405 (2002).
9. D. Brock Homby, Stepping Down, 8 J. App. Prac. & Process 265, 269-70 (2006)
("I now tell law clerks when I hire them that their experience will be far more like that of
appellate clerks than it would have been in 1990, and that they will spend much more time
studying written briefs, listening to oral arguments, and writing opinions than struggling
with jury instructions and evidentiary rulings in the courtroom. Of course, when I tell them
this, I am talking about my own professional worklife."). He rightly attributes the
transformation of roles to Supreme Court opinions re-writing Rule 56 to enlarge the use of
summary judgments. Id. at 268 n. 2; see Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush to Judgment:
Are the "Litigation Explosion, " "Liability Crisis, " and Efficiency Clich~s Eroding Our
Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments? 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (2003)). And the
Supreme Court in 2007 further extended summary judgment practice to magnify this effect.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, - U.S. - 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007).
10. Homby, supra n. 9, at 269.
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legislative function. Consider then the question: "Why do we
still call them appellate judges-or Justices-if their primary
task is to proclaim law as legislators?'
Yes, of course, appellate courts make law. But we do have
other institutions to provide that service. The indispensable task
of the appellate court is to correct error, or perhaps more
precisely, to convince the parties and their counsel that the
possibility of incorrect application of the law has been seriously
considered by judges of rank and security, and to remind trial
judges that they are indeed confined by the law in the choices
that they may make in response to overtures from parties.
Congressman David Culberson, who in 1891 led the initiative to
establish the United States Courts of Appeals, proclaimed his
purpose as the constraint of the "kingly power" of federal trial
judges who were then too numerous and too self-indulgent to be
corrected by one Supreme Court. 12 If the newly commissioned
intermediate appellate judges were to make law, that effort was
to be merely incidental to their primary task of making the trial
judges visibly accountable for their fidelity to controlling law.
Indeed, that same expectation was framed by the common
law tradition of judicial lawmaking, which was a secondary and
often unnoticed effect of decisions reviewing rulings by first
instance judges for correctness as enforcements of law. The laws
made by early appellate judges were traditionally expressed only
in brief oral explanations of their decisions that might be
synthesized by a reporter whose published report might or might
not be attended by lawyers and judges in later cases. As
Tennyson explained, law made by
common law judges was a
"wilderness of single instances."' 3
Congressman Culberson surely had it right that federal
district courts need to be held to account for their use of the
great powers vested in them. This is, I suggest, with respect to
11. Judge Posner has identified the Supreme Court of the United States as not a court,
but a superlegislature. Richard D. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
31, 35 (2005) (pointing out that "it is no longer feasible for the Court to control the lower
courts by means of narrow, case-by-case determinations-the patient, incremental method
of the common law," and that it "must perforce act legislatively").
12. 21 Cong. Rec. 3403 (1890).
13. Alfred, Lord Tennyson, Aylmer's Field, lines 435-439, in The Poetical Works of
Tennyson 241, 246 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1974) (reprint of 1898 edition) (also available at
http://classiclit.about.com/library/bl-etexts/atennyson/bl-aten-aylmer.htm).
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civil matters, even more true in our day than in his. 14 Our trial

courts increasingly resemble bureaucracies, as their staffs have
been enlarged with a growing number of magistrate judges,
bankruptcy judges, court-annexed arbitrators, special masters,
law clerks, and mediators. 15 Recent reforms of civil procedure in
courts of first instance have been in the direction of enlarging

the power and discretion of the trial judge' 6 in managing a cadre
of assistants, causing him or her increasingly to resemble the
awesome
'7 Chancellors of old, who did in reality exercise royal
power.
If American law is to play the traditional and expected role

of holding together a vast, diverse, and conflicted population by
assuring adequately shared trust in law and its institutions,
litigants must perceive that they are getting the personal
attention of judges that is the heart of the Due Process
guaranteed by state and federal constitutions. Judges sitting on
appellate benches, and their subordinates, must therefore give
serious attention to appellate procedures and structures
established to ensure the measures of accountability and
transparency required to assure litigants, and the public, that the
job is being done, and being done by those whose job it is to do
it.

Seldom is attention given in the curricula of most American
law schools to the subject of the law governing the appellate
process. Law professors are, like the future judges they instruct,
universally fascinated with the substantive politics of the law
14. There was no right to appeal a criminal conviction ina federal court until 1888. It
was at first limited to capital cases, but was extended to all convictions by the 1891 Act.
And it would be many decades before the right to counsel was respected. See generally
Lester Bernhardt Orfield, CriminalAppeals in America (Little, Brown 1959).
15. This growth was first approved by Congress in the Federal Magistrates Act of
1968, 82 Stat. 1108, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39. Cf Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Justices White, Powell, and Burger found the majority
decision upholding the statute to have read Article Ill out of the Constitution. Id. at 113
(White, J., Burger, C.J., & Powell, J., dissenting).
16. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 Wis. L. Rev. 631; Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury
Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1996).
17. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1987); Amalia D.
Kessler, Our InquisitorialTradition: Equity Procedure,Due Process, and the Search for
an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1181 (2005); Jonathan T. Molot, An
Old JudicialRole for a New Litigation Era, 113 Yale L.J. 27 (2003).
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that appellate judges make, but very few are seriously attentive
to the complexities of the institutional duties and responsibilities
that may be neglected or misused by the empowered judiciary.
Those who teach civil or criminal procedure seldom give more
than glancing attention to issues of appellate jurisdiction, or the
appropriate standards of review, or the institutional need for
transparency, or even to what might be loosely described as
appellate due process.
Daniel Meador, the senior editor of this book, invented the
course for which it is designed. He aimed to correct that
curricular failing and cause more lawyers, judges, and
lawmakers to be informed of the public interest in the structure
and conduct of appellate courts. The value of the course and the
importance of the book may be more apparent in light of the
events leading to its development.
Professor Meador's first edition reflected his major role in
the work of the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice. That
group was summoned in the 1970s by the Federal Judicial
Center and its leader, Judge Alfred P. Murrah, to consider
proposed reforms in appellate procedure and in the structure of
federal appellate courts, and, incidentally, in state appellate
courts as well. The climax of the Council's work was a large
national conference called to San Diego in 1975 to consider the
thoughts of the Council; the National Center for State Courts
joined in its sponsorship. Conferees were presented with three
studies on which they were invited to reflect. One study had
been conducted by the American Bar Foundation under the
direction of this reviewer,' 8 another by a commission appointed
by the Supreme Court and led by Professor Paul Freund, r9 and a
third by a commission created by the Senate Judiciary

18. American Bar Foundation, Accommodating the Workload of the United States
Courts of Appeals (Am. Bar Found. 1968); this report was later elaborated upon by the
study's director. See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 542 (1969).
19. Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, Report, 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972);
this study favored a court with jurisdiction to shield the Court from the task of deciding
certiorari petitions. Members of the Court were offended by the suggested restraint on the
power of the Justices to decide what cases they choose to decide. For reflections, see Philip
B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Judicial Function (U. Chicago Press 1975); Doris
Marie Provine, Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court (U. Chicago Press
1980).
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Committee and chaired by Senator Roman Hruska. 20 These three
studies were united in the view that reforms in the federal
appellate structure and practice were overdue.
That conference and its antecedents were responsive to
growing caseloads requiring increasing numbers of judges in
state as well as federal courts. In substantial measure, the
growing caseloads were the result of reforms in criminal
procedure and in the rights of prisoners to appellate and
collateral review of convictions, and to decent conditions of
imprisonment. Much of the new caseload was cases uninspiring
to those assigned to hear and decide them. Many appeals were
pro forma, 2 1 and more than a few were advanced pro se.
Memorable to the reviewer was an account of one appellate
judge who described an appeal then recently heard that was
primarily based on the noticed fact that the national flag was not
on display in the courtroom in which the defendant was
convicted, "and then counsel went on to his weaker arguments."
The lawyer making that argument may have been doing the best
possible job to vindicate his client's constitutional right to
appellate review. Increasingly, oral arguments were denied;
most appellate opinions were brief and often unpublished, but
the others became longer, perhaps to give more orders to lower
courts in the hope of reducing the need to correct their errors.
And as the number of appellate judges increased, their
statements of the law were declining in the weight of their
authority. While they differed in details, all three noted studies
and the Advisory Council agreed that structural change was
needed in the federal courts to assure that the appellate function
could be more adequately performed.
The work of the Council was later recorded in a book
authored by Meador, this reviewer, and Maurice Rosenberg2 2 to
record and explain the view prevailing among its members, who
20. Report of the Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System,
61 ABA J. 819 (1975); see also Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System, Structureand Internal Procedures:Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195
(1975).
21. In Anders v. Cal., 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Court held that appointed counsel
abandoning an appeal must file a brief explaining the absence of a viable appellate
argument.
22. Professor Rosenberg, now deceased, was then a professor at the Columbia Law
School.
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were united in the view that a time for reforming the federal
appellate courts had arrived. That book was published in 1976.23
Professor Meador became an Assistant Attorney General in
1977. Attorney General Griffin Bell, another member of the
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, commissioned him to
initiate reforms in the structure of the federal judiciary. There
were no direct results of his efforts, but they did lead to the
creation of the Federal Circuit in 1982.24 Alas, that reform was
not among those proposed by the American Bar Foundation
group, the Supreme Court's Freund committee, or the Senate's
Hruska commission. That new court was given exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals in certain intellectual property cases
notwithstanding cautions against specialized
appellate
25
judgeships and the country's unfavorable experience with the
Commerce Court.26 Perhaps the Federal Circuit has not fallen
into the same trap or maybe it has; experts on intellectual
property law might perceive that the court strongly favors
property rights at the expense of the public domain. If there are
interest groups seeking to influence the selection of judges to be
appointed to that court, it is surely those enriched by the
expansion of intellectual property rights, and not those who
merely wish for less costly access to ideas and art.
In 1979, Professor Meador returned from the Department
of Justice to the University of Virginia Law School. He then
created the law school course on Appeals and developed the first

23. See Paul D. Carrington, Daniel J. Meador & Maurice Rosenburg, Justiceon Appeal
(West Pub. Co. 1976) [hereinafter Justice on Appeal]. The recommendations of the
Advisory Council appear on pages 254-255. The authors' more elaborate recommendations
appear on pages 225-231.
24. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, P.L. 97-164. The portions of the Act
relevant to this discussion are now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (available at http:uscode
.house.gov).
25. Indeed, Meador and his co-authors considered the problem and proposed that a
court such as the Federal Circuit, if established, should be served by judges rotating to that
court from the regional circuits. Justiceon Appeal, supra n. 23, at 220. The purpose of such
rotation would be to diminish the lawmaking role of the court and insulate the process of
judicial selection from the influence of those having the greatest stake in intellectual
property law. Id.
26. The Commerce Court was created by the Mann-Elkins Act, 36 Stat. 539 (1910), to
review decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and abolished three years later,
38 Stat. 208 (1913), because its judgeships so quickly became a major target of those with
a stake in railroad politics.
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edition of the book under review. 27 At the same time, he

instituted a graduate program for newly elected or appointed
appellate judges whom he hoped, among other things, to
acquaint with the issues giving rise to the percolating reformist
agenda. 28 While the first edition of the book reflected work that
Meador had done with Maurice Rosenberg and myself, and
incorporated some suggestions made by us, neither Rosenberg
nor I was entirely comfortable with being identified as a coeditor. Neither of us found occasion to teach the course from the
first edition, and neither of us received royalties from its sale. It
is thus Meador's vision and Meador's book that has been
elegantly updated by the junior editors, Baker and Steinman.
Except for the creation of the Federal Circuit, none of the
reforms advanced by the three studies or by the Advisory
Council has been seriously considered by Congress. Meanwhile,
two more studies were conducted, one under the auspices of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, 29 and another
commissioned by Congress and led by retired Justice Byron
White, then assisted by Professor Meador.3 ° Their
recommendations resemble those advanced in the three previous
studies. There was also the 1994 work of Professor Baker, 3 1 who
had begun in 1987 publishing thoughtful reflections on the need
for reform. 32 Professors William Reynolds and William
Richman joined the chorus about the same time.3 3 And then

27. Daniel J. Meador, Maurice Rosenberg & Paul D. Carrington, Appellate Courts:
Structures, Functions, Processes andPersonnel (Michie Co. 1994).
28. See Virginia Law, Master of Laws in the JudicialProcess,http://www.law.virginia
.edu/html/prospectives/judges/judges.htm (noting that the graduate program for judges was
established in 1980, but has since been discontinued) (accessed Oct. 10, 2007; copy on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
29. Judith A. McKenna, Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1993).
30. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final
Report (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1999), http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc-catalog.nsf/autoframepage!
openform&url=/library/fjc-catalog.nsf/DPublication!openform&parentunid=0B9620FF463
BF37285256CA300675A01 (accessed Nov. 9, 2007).
31. Thomas E. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal-The Problems of the U.S. Courts
of Appeals (West Pub. Co. 1994).
32. E.g. Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for A New National
Court, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1400 (1987).
33. E.g. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the
New Certiorari:Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273 (1996);
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the cause.34 But
notwithstanding an almost universally shared opinion that the
system was failing in both federal and state courts to serve the
public need, no substantial proposal regarding the appellate
structure has been seriously considered by Congress. To be sure,
there were skeptics inclined to prefer the evolving system of
federal appeals to the proposals for reform; Professor Arthur
Hellman stands out3 5 as the leading academic voice resisting the
came

Professor

Steinman

to

join

clamor for reform.

In 2005, at the urging of Professor Meador, the American
Academy of Appellate Lawyers staged a conference redolent of
the 1975 event organized by the Advisory Council on Appellate
Justice.36 The Academy, unlike the Advisory Council, had no
agenda of reform, and I am aware of no reform initiatives that
resulted from the event. As a participant, I spoke with many able
appellate judges. I frequently heard the observation that all is
well, that the infrequency of oral argument is insignificant
because so many of the lawyers wishing to present arguments
are simply not worth listening to. And I heard the explanation
that judges and their staffs need to concentrate on polishing their
published opinions because it is by the quality of those
utterances that their professional careers will be judged by their
peers and by posterity. It was also said that the creation of more
judgeships would merely increase the difficulty of maintaining
coherence. I have no doubt that there is some merit in each of
these observations.

But I hope even so that this book and the law school course
it serves to organize will advance the cause of appellate court
law reform. Judge Clement Haynsworth was entirely correct in
his observation that "reform in the administration of justice is a
fragile thing, easily wrecked by stout opposition from even a

see William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Appellate Judgeships, I J.
App. Prac. & Process 37 (1999).
34. E.g. Joan E. Steinman, The Scope of Appellate Jurisdiction: Pendent Appellate
JurisdictionBefore and After Swint, 49 Hastings L.J. 1337 (1998).
35. E.g, Arthur D. Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will
It Work? 11 Hastings Const. L.Q. 375 (1984); Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The
White Commission Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 377
(2000).
36. The Conference proceedings were published in Volume 8, Issue 1, of this Journal.

THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS

small handful or two of respected or influential persons," 37 for
what is everyone's business is no one's special concern. And the
Judicial Conference of the United States, like any fraternal
organization, is almost incapable of seriously considering any
scheme that diminishes the discretion or impairs the status of its
members. Professor Hellman's skepticism toward reform tends,
then, to find a congenial audience among members of the
judicial fraternity. And Professor Tigar has aptly quoted
Chesterton's dictum
that judges "are not cruel. They just get
38
things."
to
used
On that account, it took a half century of agitation after
observers first noticed the need for the Courts of Appeals before
Congressman Culberson and Senator William Evarts at last
secured enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1891. And that was
before the Judiciary Act of 192239 established the Judicial
Conference of the United States, an event leading to a major
enlargement of the political power of the judicial fraternity.
It is not merely the intermediate courts that are in need of
serious reform. In 2005, Professor Meador and I joined an
eminent group-something of a philosophic successor to the
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice-that recommended term
limits for Justices 40 as a first step in providing Congressional
checks and balances on an institution that, in our view, has
become too big for its britches. As Judge Posner has observed
the Court has come to think of itself as a superlegislature4
largely unconcerned with whether specific cases have been
37. Ltr. from Clement F. Haynsworth, J., U.S. Ct. of App. for the 4th Cir., to Prof. A.
Leo Levin, Exec. Dir., Commn. on Rev. of the Fed. Ct. App. Sys. (Apr. 30, 1975), in
Hearings before the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System vol. Il,
1327 (1975).
38. Michael E. Tigar, A Review of Appellate Courts (2d ed. 2006), 2007 Fed. Cts. L.
Rev. 2 (July 2007), http://www.fclr.org/2007fedctslrev2.htm (accessed Nov. 9, 2007).
39. See An Act for the Appointment of an Additional Circuit Judge for the Fourth
Judicial Circuit, for the Appointment of Additional District Judges for Certain Districts,
Providing for an Annual Conference of Certain Judges, and for Other Purposes, 42 Stat.
837 (1922).
40. The proposal is that the terms of Supreme Court Justices should be limited so that a
new Justice would be appointed within each two-year term of Congress, which would yield
a normal term extending to eighteen years. See Reforming the Court: Term Limits for
Justices (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., Carolina Academic Press 2006)
(including in addition to the text of the proposed Act numerous ideas for reform advanced
by those commenting on the proposal).
41. Posner,supra n. 11, at 35-39.
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decided with correct regard for the rights of parties. Its staff of
law clerks, sitting as its certiorari panel, plays a large role in the
selection of the few cases it agrees to decide, so that the Justices
provide a model for lower court judges opting to delegate their
scutwork to staff, and to limit their own chores to those that are
more fun.
While the editors of this second edition of Appellate Courts
have devoted a brief chapter to the management of the Supreme
Court, there is no reference to the scheme advanced by Meador,
myself, and others in 2005, surely in part because the volume
advancing that idea and numerous other proposals for reform
had not been published when Appellate Courts went to press.
But those teaching the course served by this book might do us
the honor of considering the diverse proposals advanced in that
volume. Also worthy of attention are two other recent books
calling attention to the extraordinary and questionable role of the
law clerks serving the Supreme Court Justices.42
The editors of this new edition are of course fully aware of
the impediments to reform. In their concluding remark, they do
not neglect to quote Arthur Vanderbilt's chestnut that "judicial
law reform is no sport for the short-winded." Given the present
state of American politics, it will require acts of truly
exceptional political courage to achieve even modest reforms to
address the issues posed in this book. Might there be legislators
willing and able to forsake the tasks of fund raising and securing
earmarks long enough to address serious institutional problems
of constitutional importance? Perhaps the best hope for
reformers is a Supreme Court that continues to write lawmaking
opinions evoking the sort of public rage that benign reforms
might be expected to ease. Only time will tell.

42. Todd C. Peppers, Courtiers of the Marble Palace: The Rise and Influence of the
Supreme Court Law Clerk (Stanford L. & Pol. 2006); Artemus Ward & David L. Weiden,
Sorcerers' Apprentices: 100 Years of Law Clerks at the United States Supreme Court
(N.Y.U. Press 2006).

